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It is not enough to say, as the Frenchmen do, that their nation was taken by surprise. A
nation, no more than a woman, is excused for the unguarded hour when the first
adventurer who comes along can do violence to her. The riddle is not solved by such
1
shifts, it is only formulated in other words.
— Karl Marx

This volume contains the research and recollections of more than a dozen
policymakers, market participants, lawyers, and academics, who both made and
wrote the history of sovereign debt over the past four decades. They came
together at a conference in late 2009—in retrospect, an innocent time when
character actors like Iceland and Ecuador had the stage to themselves—on the
eve of what would become the mother of all sovereign debt meltdowns in the
Eurozone. The conference happened because Lee Buchheit taught us that we
could not understand sovereign debt contracts, markets, or policies without
knowing their history; he then prevailed upon us to gather the history-makers
and history-writers together before memories faded. As always, his insight and
timing were flawless.
Lee’s career defines the modern legal history of sovereign debt. Just about
every sovereign contract written since Mexico’s 1982 debt moratorium contains
a Buchheit innovation. He has been called the godfather, the guru, the patron
saint—and occasionally, with grudging admiration, the evil genius—of the field.
He always seems to know all the answers, and is equally gracious in sharing
them with heads of state anxious to meet payment due dates, and graduate
students crashing against paper deadlines. His disciples (ourselves included)
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now populate the practice, policy, and academic fields of sovereign debt the
world over. Beyond his practice and service, Lee’s vast body of academic
writing dominates the literature, with good reason: his knowledge, foresight,
and citation count are unsurpassed, and his prose makes LIBOR sing.
In this introductory essay, we will avoid the usual business of summarizing
the distinguished contributions to this volume. Their authors have long been the
leading voices of sovereign debt theory and practice; our purpose in the
conference and the issue has been to let these voices be heard directly and in
full, not in quoted snippets stitched into a unifying gimmick. Instead, we will
praise them by attempting to apply their history lessons to the evolution of
collective action clauses (CACs) from the 1995 crisis in Mexico to the 2010 crisis
in Europe.
Our attempt is necessarily tentative: the European crisis is unfolding as we
write, and its implications may not be fully known for years. However, to a
remarkable extent—and bearing out Lee’s predictions—Europe has revived the
policy and theoretical riddles of crises long ago and far away. In particular, we
focus on the triumphant return of CACs as the legal and policy fix for sovereign
debt distress. Several articles in this issue explore CACs’ first moment in the
sun, as a response to the sovereign crises of the 1990s and 2000s. Today, we are
told by politicians and academics alike that, if only debt contracts in the
Eurozone could be revised to include CACs, debtors and creditors would
swiftly come to share the burden of an “orderly debt restructuring,” paving the
way for politically sustainable economic growth.
Below we offer a brief tour of the modern history of CACs, which may
temper such optimism. But even before we get to the history, it is worth noting
a few puzzling aspects of today’s CAC revival. First, most of the sovereign debt
contracts at issue already contain either CACs or even more powerful legal
tools to promote restructuring. To our knowledge, no policymaker has tried to
use them, or even to examine them comprehensively to see whether they could
be used. Second, in stark contrast to the 1990s and 2000s, no policy maker has
identified a collective action problem for collective action clauses to solve in
European sovereign debt. To be sure, few doubt that there is a debt problem—
but no one has described a coordination problem. Finally, the policy statements
that trumpet CACs are notably incoherent as a legal matter: proposing to
include standard-form clauses in contracts that either have them already, or
could not possibly fit them because they use radically different drafting
conventions. Again, to be sure, there is a way to make any debt contract
restructuring-friendly—but that is quite different from grafting CACs onto
anything that moves. All this raises the old questions—why CACs, why here,
and why now?—which we tried, but failed to answer years ago. Inspired by the
contributions to this issue, we try again.
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I
A FIX IS BORN
CACs were first mooted as an answer to sovereign debt crises after the 1995
U.S. and International Monetary Fund (IMF) rescue package for Mexico, which
topped $40 billion.2 Although the loan was quickly repaid and made money for
the U.S. Treasury, it caused much political, policy, and academic consternation.
Critics complained that the package bailed out reckless private lenders and
sovereign borrowers, and created expectations that public money would be on
offer from here on out, along with perverse incentives to accumulate
unsustainable debts. The response was twofold: first, the rescue package was
the only alternative to a Mexican bond default, which would have had untold
consequences for the global markets in general and the U.S. economy in
particular; and second, to avoid future bailouts, governments had to devise ways
to renegotiate their bonds in an orderly fashion, to make restructuring a
plausible option when it mattered.
The view that bond restructuring would be unfathomably messy rested on a
very specific element of sovereign bond documentation practice in New York:
the contractual requirement that each bondholder approve a change in financial
terms.3 Because bondholders were generally understood to be dispersed and
disorderly, this made New York-law bond contracts essentially restructuringproof in the absence of a sovereign equivalent to bankruptcy. Mexico was the
prime example of the problem, since it was one of the biggest emerging market
sovereign bond issuers in the New York market.
The only glitch in this reasoning as grounds for the 1995 policy response was
that this particular Mexican debt crisis did not implicate its New York-law
bonds. The culprit instruments were tesobonos, Mexican-law, dollar-indexed
debt that skyrocketed as the Mexican peso fell. To this day, no policy or
academic work we know has reproduced or analyzed the restructuring
provisions of tesobonos. Everything we know about the 1995 crisis suggests that
such provisions, if they existed, did not figure prominently in the rescue
decision. And even if tesobonos had contained a flat bar to restructuring,
Mexico had a trump card against its bondholders: the power to enact a law to
restructure the bonds by fiat. To be sure, creditors would have complained, and
might even have shut Mexico out of the markets. Moreover, a restructuring
might have caused knock-on effects throughout the world precisely of the sort
that policymakers had feared. But it is hard to see how any of this would have
changed by fixing a contractual flaw that may or may not have existed.

2. For the history recounted in this essay, see generally Anna Gelpern & G. Mitu Gulati, Public
Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1627 (2006); Anna Gelpern & G. Mitu
Gulati, Innovation after the Revolution: Foreign Sovereign Bond Contracts Since 2003, 4 CAP. MARKETS
L.J. 85 (2009).
3. No statute or case law mandated this practice; we return to this point in the next section.
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In fairness to the policymakers and academics who pressed for CACs then,
many of them looked beyond tesobonos at the large stock of New York-law
foreign sovereign bonds, a market dominated by vulnerable Latin American
states, and tried to expand policy options for the next sovereign crisis. But the
next crisis, which struck in 1997, happened in Asia and involved corporate and
bank debt, which could be restructured in bankruptcy. And by 2003, when
Mexico led the New York market shift to adopt CACs, it was apparent that
sovereign bonds with unanimity provisions were not restructuring-proof.
Ecuador (represented by Lee Buchheit) engineered a debt exchange in 2000
that produced record levels of debt relief with the participation of ninety-seven
percent of its bondholders, notwithstanding New York-style unanimity
provisions in its debt contracts. Not until Argentina’s default in 2001 did
collective action problems in foreign sovereign bonds begin to sound like a
plausible obstacle to restructuring, with CACs as a plausible, though hardly a
critical, solution.
II
FALSE STARTS AND MUDDY HISTORIES
Apart from their awkward connection to the tesobono crisis, it is hard to
criticize CACs on the merits. At worst, their advocates said, introducing them
would do no harm—and there was a good chance that they could actually help
if and when the right crisis rolled around. But the fact that the markets would
have none of these apparently harmless CACs despite strenuous policy and
academic overtures beginning in 1996, revived a nagging question: Why did
someone insert unanimity terms in New York bonds in the first place, and why
did they become market standard? This was especially perplexing since
comparable contracts in the London market often could be amended with
majority consent.
Finding the reason for unanimity was important because if bondholders had
deliberately made their bonds hard to restructure, then bailing them out set up
precisely the wrong incentives. Next time around, creditors would simply put in
place another kind of contract barrier to restructuring, certain of getting paid
from the public coffers. On the other hand, if there were a more innocent
explanation for unanimity in sovereign bonds, it would help justify the policy
response (official financing followed by contract reform) without distorting
incentives.
A popular history of unanimity at the time traced its origins to more-or-less
mindless copying from corporate bond contracts. Sleep-deprived associates in
New York law firms had lifted unanimity clauses from corporate deals, either
unaware of such clauses’ provenance in the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (TIA),
which did not apply to sovereign debt, or perhaps under the mistaken
impression that TIA applied to sovereigns after all. Since there was no TIA
equivalent in the United Kingdom, this theory also explained the difference
between New York and English law markets. Best of all, thus framed, the

GELPERN & GULATI

Fall 2010]

1/8/2011

FOREWORD

v

problem was actionable: it could be solved by teaching market participants and
their lawyers that the law did not mandate these irrational provisions.
Statesmen, bankers, and lawyers of good faith would then come around to the
more efficient English model, and bailouts would end.
This history of blind copying and misunderstood laws turns out to be
problematic, which casts doubt on its policy prescriptions. First, differences in
sovereign bond contracts do not map to the adoption of TIA in the United
States. Most sovereign bond contracts in the United States and the United
Kingdom alike used no amendment provisions at all from the 1950s through the
1970s. Although the sovereign bond market was relatively small in those days,
its documentation practices were consistent with the way sovereign bond
contracts had been written going back at least to the early 1800s, through the
many booms and busts of financial globalization. The absence of amendment
terms may have meant that negotiated restructuring was inconceivable to the
drafters, or that the drafters had deliberately sought to make it inconceivable by
refusing to chart a path for it. On the other hand, it might have reflected a
history of delegating sovereign debt problems to the diplomatic process, which
left limited room for contractual solutions or bondholder democracy.
The split between U.S. and U.K. amendment conventions appears to have
begun in the early to mid-1980s. In the background, suing sovereigns had
become easier because sovereign immunity doctrines were narrowed; states had
begun to suspend payments on commercial bank loans; and high-profile
corporate Eurobond defaults had shaken market faith in bonds’ status as a
privileged asset class. Sovereign bonds issued in New York then began to
require unanimous bondholder consent to amend financial terms, and a simple
majority to amend the rest. Bondholders could be polled at a meeting or in
writing. Similar bonds issued in London began to require supermajority consent
obtained in a meeting to amend any terms.4 The causes of divergence between
New York and London merit further investigation beyond the scope of this
essay. However, it is at least plausible that the U.S. unanimity convention
emerged as a result of the defaults and restructurings of the 1980s that began
with Mexico in 1982 and culminated in the 1989 Brady Plan.5 If so, then its
purpose may have been to bind debtor and creditor governments irrevocably to
their promise of no more restructurings. New rescue packages played into
creditors’ hands, paying out on the insurance policy written into the bond
contracts.
From the perspective of the official sector—governments in wealthy states
and international organizations—any such insurance was either underpriced or
no longer sustainable as a matter of domestic politics. A new regime without
implicit bailout insurance had to be devised going forward. CACs were central

4. If the meeting were postponed, the supermajority threshold went down dramatically.
5. See generally Ross P. Buckley, The Facilitation of the Brady Plan: Emerging Markets Debt
Trading from 1989 to 1993, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1802 (1998).
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to the new regime, and here again, the reasons for their exclusion heretofore
made a big difference. If unanimity had been a deliberate barrier to
restructuring, one would expect the markets to resist CACs, and if resistance
failed, to seek new ways to make their debt restructuring-proof.
III
INTERVENTION THEORIES
By the turn of the twenty-first century and the onset of Argentina’s debt
crisis, sovereign bond contracts embodied a double theoretical conundrum: they
were written to exacerbate coordination problems among bondholders, and
failed to change after the coordination problems were identified and publicized.
This combined diagnosis of coordination problems and “stickiness” of
apparently suboptimal terms suggested a market failure, and mobilized
established academic theories for public intervention. Government action in the
form of education, coordination, and moral suasion was especially appropriate
if unanimity in New York had been a product of blind copying, rather than a
deliberate effort to discipline the debtor or extort the public sector.
And educate, coordinate, and suade they did. Top national and
international finance officials commissioned research papers, chartered groups
of legal experts and economists, hosted conferences, gave speeches, and spoke
to debtors and creditors. But for years, the mammoth public relations campaign
failed to convince market actors to shift to CACs.
As best we can tell, the factor that tipped the shift in New York bond
documentation in 2003 was a more muscular proposal by the IMF to resolve
coordination problems with a treaty-based sovereign bankruptcy regime. The
proposal dominated policy agendas for over a year, and came to be seen as a
formidable threat by opponents of official intervention in the sovereign debt
markets. The enduring policy salience of the bankruptcy initiative was a
surprise to many observers. It was, in large part, a product of the idiosyncratic
leadership at the U.S. Treasury and the IMF, the U.S. political transition,
Argentina’s debt crisis, and even the attacks of 9/11. When a treaty regime
became more plausible, sovereign debtors and their bondholders became more
enthusiastic about adopting CACs as a means of foreclosing further discussion
of such a regime.
By late 2003, CAC proponents in the official sector were able to declare
victory. Mexico issued a New York-law bond with CACs in February; within
months, issuers were switching in droves, and soon over seventy percent of the
New York sovereign market had CACs.
The relative merits of CACs and treaty-based sovereign bankruptcy have
been debated for years; many of the key arguments are documented in this
issue. It is not our place to arbitrate among them. However, as between CACs
and unanimity, we have little trouble siding with CACs. We are glad that they
have been adopted. Moreover, the fact that the CAC templates launched in the
New York market have since spontaneously spread to London, displacing the
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old English law template, suggests that markets saw merit in the New York
innovation. Yet we remain uneasy about the stated premises for public
intervention.
We have already noted that the blind copying history of unanimity looks
questionable. Moreover, the view of unanimity as a complete bar to
restructuring was unsettled (if not entirely dislodged) by debt exchanges in
Ecuador, Uruguay, and arguably even Argentina, which got deep debt relief
from over three-quarters of its CAC-less bondholders. This suggests that the
coordination problem may be overstated. The theory of contract “stickiness”
underpinning government action may over-reach as well. After the market had
switched in 2003, it turned out that many small issuers (Qatar, Egypt, Lebanon,
and Kazakhstan, among others) had been using CACs in their New York-law
bonds for years with no official prompting.
Perhaps the markets were fully capable of adopting CACs when they
wanted to. It was just that most participants did not have good enough reasons
to use them. If participants in the shift are to be believed, few thought that the
CACs they adopted would make any difference in their capacity to restructure,
their chances of receiving public money, or the way in which any sovereign
managed its debts going forward. Most said they adopted CACs on the
assumption that they did nothing much for them, except the possibility of
deflecting a sovereign bankruptcy treaty.6 Comments to this effect question the
case for intervention, but also the roles of academic theories and legal experts
in brokering a market shift.
IV
EXPERTS AND EFFICACY
Having supplied a theory for government action to dislodge unanimity,
economists and lawyers turned to bolstering the official sector’s case to the
markets, and designing alternatives to the unanimity terms in New York bonds.
The fruits of their efforts raise the possibility that CACs had two distinct jobs: a
political job of deflecting a bankruptcy treaty while signaling no more
government bailouts, and a legal job of facilitating orderly restructuring.
The leading argument put forward against CACs in the 1990s and early
2000s was that they would raise borrowing costs for adopters by making
restructuring easier, or by signaling that the borrower saw contract amendment
as part of its debt management toolkit. To test the argument, economists
studied bond prices in the New York and London markets, which presented a
natural experiment in using different amendment terms in otherwise similar
instruments. Although some studies suggested minor price differences between
the two markets, others found none. Mexico’s 2003 New York issue with CACs

6. Whether such a regime targeted the right problems and would have been effective in solving
them is beyond the scope of this essay.
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arguably confirmed the point: the price penalty was either minuscule or
nonexistent.
We heard two explanations for such results during the CAC campaign. First,
the absence of a big price penalty may confirm that markets do not know and
do not care what debt contracts say. This explanation goes well with the story of
mindless copying by lawyers: no one thinks about contract terms until it is too
late. Second, the price penalty for making restructuring more likely may be
offset by making it more orderly with well-crafted CACs. This explanation
implies the polar opposite of the first: that bondholders care deeply about
contract changes, appreciate their consequences for the restructuring process,
and can calculate the likely outcomes with some precision. A third category of
explanations comes from watching sovereign bond contracts evolve since the
official sector stopped advocating for CACs: what if pre-2003 London bonds
had contained hidden obstacles to restructuring, which made their CACs
ineffective, and made them essentially the same as the New York bonds?
Moreover, what if Mexico’s CACs had made it no easier to restructure, and
what if the CACs that followed had compensated for restructuring ease in other
ways? In the alternative, what if bonds with and without CACs could be
restructured with comparable ease, using slightly different restructuring
techniques? Any of these scenarios would produce price convergence in New
York and London.
Drafting and using CACs is a job for legal experts. Their work in the run up
to and after the 2003 shift to CACs in New York might help test the third set of
explanations.
Before the shift in New York, markets had seen several restructurings of
English-law sovereign bonds with CACs, including the high-profile cases of
Pakistan and Ukraine. Students and advocates of CACs were perplexed to
learn that neither Pakistan nor Ukraine chose to use the CACs they had.
Anecdotal reports from these restructurings blamed the mandatory meeting
provision, then standard in English-law CACs. No debtor would want to broker
a meeting among its creditors, lawyers said, because it risked uniting them
against the debtor. If such anecdotes hold up, they would suggest that the
meeting requirement had made English-law bonds resistant to restructuring
much as unanimity did in New York. Traditional English-law CACs were
suboptimal. This explanation appears to find support in market practice since
2003. Issuers in New York did not simply copy the prevailing English form
when they moved to CACs; they replaced unanimity with supermajority by
written consent. Meanwhile, English-law bonds after 2003 did away with
meetings and adopted elements of the new New York form, unprompted by the
U.K. authorities.
If CACs were an important prong of the official sector’s anti-bailout
commitment, and if old English CACs did not work, it is puzzling that
governments refused to mandate effective CACs. By all accounts, the
sponsorship of an expert drafting group by the Group of Ten (G-10) in 2002
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was an effort to present an alternative to unanimity, not to mandate a contract
template. No one had ever pressured issuers in London to change their form.
No participant in any sovereign bond market was ever scolded for departing
from the G-10 form. Moreover, since 2003, markets used the G-10 clauses,
along with others developed by industry groups, as a basis for experimenting
with different versions of CACs in New York and London with no official
involvement whatsoever—even when some of them had partially resurrected
unanimity.
Did all this experimentation make CACs a viable restructuring tool and—
more importantly—one capable of preempting official bailouts? Perhaps, but
the evidence is thin. CACs were used only once, in 2007, to restructure New
York-law bonds issued by Belize (represented by Lee Buchheit). Belize was not
a high-stakes battleground for burden-sharing between taxpayers and private
creditors, unlike the half-dozen CAC-less restructurings that came before.
This mini-history points to the possibility that CACs’ work as a symbolic
statement to preempt sovereign bankruptcy and inveigh against bailouts was
quite distinct from their work to facilitate orderly restructuring. The former was
done quickly, and did not depend on CACs’ efficacy as a restructuring tool. The
latter is ongoing, and its success is hard to gauge. The tenuous link between
CACs’ political and legal efficacy finds a stark illustration in the 2010 debt crisis
in Europe.
V
SECOND-TIME FARCE
Karl Marx’s biting take on European history, The Eighteenth Brumaire of
Louis Bonaparte, opens with the proposition that historical facts happen twice,
“Once as tragedy, and again as farce.”7 CACs’ return to the policy scene in 2010
may well fit the pattern.
As of 2009, policy and market interest in CACs had faded: drafting groups
were disbanded, official and market reports disappeared, and contract
templates returned to lawyers’ offices from whence they came. The degree of
disinterest was such that even when we discovered some London-based
issuances resurrecting unanimity, no one seemed to care. CACs were a thing of
the past, which seemed to be the general sentiment of those who had worked on
the last CAC initiative.
But then, in late 2009, the unthinkable happened. A sovereign debt crisis hit
the Eurozone. It came to light that European governments had gone on a
borrowing spree, and government-backed banks had lent into all manner of
asset bubbles, taking advantage of low interest rates. Markets were also
shocked to discover that European governments were not immune from
fudging statistics. Spreads shot up on Greek, Irish, Portuguese, Spanish, and
7. KARL MARX, THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF LOUIS BONAPARTE 5 (Daniel D. Leon trans.,
2d ed. 1907) (1897).
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Italian debts, reflecting debt burdens that looked unsustainable in retrospect.
With the Euro under attack, the specter of defaults and bailouts was back.
Throughout 2010, a series of co-financing arrangements between the IMF
and the European Union made upwards of a trillion dollars available to
distressed EU states, in exchange for fiscal austerity measures and structural
reforms familiar from past crises in the developing world. This turn of events
was particularly embarrassing to Europe for two reasons. First, as a global
reserve currency, the Euro was supposed to be risk-free, which allowed member
states to borrow worldwide in Euros and under domestic law. Second, the
treaties establishing the Union had ostensibly outlawed bailouts, barring
member states and EU institutions from assuming the debts of other member
states. The first factor made default beyond contemplation. The second made a
bailout illegal.
Faced with two conflicting imperatives, EU officials chose the former:
default on Euro-denominated debt would not happen. As often happens, clever
lawyers found a way around the apparently impermeable treaty barriers to
bailouts. However, this choice triggered enormous political backlash against the
European rescue facility. This was especially true in Germany, which would be
footing much of the bill thanks to its combination of fiscal surplus and its banks’
exposure to the peripheral member states.
As in the 1990s and early 2000s, the 2010 bailout decision was followed by
calls for burden-sharing and reform. Statutory sovereign bankruptcy was
mooted again with public support by the German leadership, and CACs figured
prominently in a November statement by European leaders, who pledged to
adopt standardized clauses “consistent with” the G-10 model going forward.8
Despite its resemblance to prior responses to sovereign distress, the return
of this sequence in Europe was peculiar in the extreme. First, the foreign-law
bonds issued by distressed EU member states already had CACs on the G-10
model. Many of these states had been at the forefront of advocating for CACs
just years earlier, and pledged to include them in their own debt to help pave
the way for the emerging markets. The crisis of 2010 was a golden opportunity
to show European leadership by deploying CACs, but no one did. Second, to
the extent the source of sovereign debt distress was domestic-law debt, it could
be restructured by fiat, much as the Mexican tesobonos could have been
restructured in the 1990s.9 The restructuring government would have faced
market opprobrium along with lawsuits in domestic and European courts, but
most of these consequences were unavoidable with or without CACs.

8. Statement by the Eurogroup (Nov. 28, 2010), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/
docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/118050.pdf.
9. See generally Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Pricing Terms in Sovereign
Debt Contracts: A Greek Case Study with Implications for the European Crisis Resolution Mechanism
(Univ. of Chicago Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 541, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1713914; Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, How to Restructure Greek Debt (Working Paper,
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1603304.
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More puzzling still, none of the European politicians advocating CACs
appeared to have any idea of what European debt contracts actually said about
amendment. Unlike the 1990s, no studies and no drafting groups had been
commissioned before November 2010. Furthermore, no one cited to collective
action or any other contract or market problems that would be solved by CACs.
Official statements about CACs referred to them as an unspecified path to
contractual burden-sharing, to be achieved case-by-case in future crises.
The most plausible interpretation of such statements, if they were to make
sense, would be as a promise to harmonize the domestic-law debt of EU
member states to include restructuring-friendly terms. However, such an
interpretation fits awkwardly with the specific reference to G-10 CACs, which
were designed for the emerging-market foreign-bond template prevailing in
New York and London. Domestic-law documentation is notoriously
idiosyncratic, and often bears no resemblance to foreign-law conventions. Our
casual review of the Greek government’s domestic-law debt follows this trend.
Grafting G-10 CACs onto domestic-law contracts—Greek sovereign bonds,
Mexican tesobonos, or U.S. Treasury securities—would more likely produce a
Frankenstein monster than a restructuring-friendly bond.
Why, then, did CACs return in 2010? One veteran of sovereign debt crises
speculated privately to us that CACs slipped in because there were no lawyers
in the room when the EU announcement was drafted. But this makes the
invocation of contract terms more, not less, puzzling. Non-lawyers left to their
own devices are not known for casual resort to legal technicality.
There remains the possibility that CACs had acquired a meaning and a
function in the early 2000s that made them politically useful in 2010. They came
to stand not only for the opposition to mandatory treaty-based bankruptcy, this
time proposed by Germany, but also for opposition to bailouts, mollifying
taxpayers in surplus states. CACs offered an unspecified and largely untested
form of market-based and flexible burden-sharing as an alternative to
unpopular public rescues of profligate bankers and governments. That the
specific technical meaning of G-10 CACs had no place in the European context,
which made their invocation uninformed or disingenuous, was beside the point.
A farce visible only to lawyers is no farce, but history in the making. The
modern history of CACs, going back to the tesobono crisis, illustrates the point.
VI
HISTORY MAKING: AN INTRODUCTION
The articles in this issue offer three distinct approaches to the legal history
of sovereign debt. Some start with sovereign debt contracts as historical
artifacts, attempting to glean from them insights into the economic conditions,
political forces, and legal practices that have come to shape today’s global
capital markets. Others focus on economic and political leadership, and see
contracts as by-products of sovereign agency and technical expertise. To yet
others, contracts (and law more broadly) are a minor constraint on sovereign
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power. We find all three approaches equally compelling, perhaps reflecting our
editorial bias. But we are even more intrigued by the combined picture that
emerges from such diverse contributions: despite the deeply flawed record of
contracts as commitment devices for or against debt restructuring, debt
contracts remain salient in policy imagination. Why?
Political scientists suggest one possibility: that politicians use CACs as a
diversion to create the illusion of decisive action in response to devastating
crises when no easy fix is at hand. In this story, politicians recognize either that
there is no ready fix for the problems underlying the crisis, or that powerful
interests will not permit a solution. However, because the public’s attention is
focused, a response is required. A response that solves a problem is preferable
to one that does not. Hence, politicians have the incentive to frame a problem
that is both understandable and solvable, which they can proceed to solve. The
fact that the invented problem may bear little relationship to the real problem is
beside the point.
The prominent framing of coordination problems in sovereign debt,
followed by CACs as their supposed solution, appears to fit the foregoing story.
CACs are both effective (as a political tool) and ineffective (as a legal
constraint), important (as a symbol) and unimportant (as a stand-alone
restructuring device). Sovereign agency is central to determining the content of
debt contracts, but perhaps as much for its desire to mislead constituents, as for
its commitment to or against restructuring. Legal and policy experts have a key
role in this picture, but not necessarily for their capacity to produce a viable tool
for future restructurings—rather for their part in creating a viable appearance
of present crisis response.
We offer this somewhat cynical unifying “theory” tongue-in-cheek, and
would not impute it to our distinguished contributors. Our explanation holds (if
at all) in a very narrow context of one set of clauses observed over a very short
period in the modern legal history of sovereign debt. Despite its occasional
prominence, “CACology” is still a niche; generalizing from it requires caution.
Full answers to the questions posed by the puzzling history of CACs are
complex, and await further research. We are immensely grateful to the authors
and history-makers represented in this issue for setting the stage for such
research, for pushing us to reopen closed cases and revisit past assumptions, for
shining new light on dusty old contracts, and for convincing us all over again
that we can never understand today’s debt crises without studying the past.

